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ARGUMENT
••-X

;i: P O I N T

i.

NO ISSUE WAS ALLEGED, TRIED OR DECIDED IN THE
TRIAL COURT THAT ANY PART OF THE CONTRACT
BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS. A PENALTY.
> ' : ;.•
The answer of Roberts, a general denial fails to
allege any issue that the contract sued upon, or any part
thereof, was invalid as a penalty.

The plaintiff,, at

the trial of this matter, attempted to introduce evidence
as to the actual damages which could be reasonably anticipated at the time the contract was made if the completion
of the job was delayed, and the trial court refused on its
own motion to hear such evidence (Tr. 1st day, pp. 5-6);
furthermore, the respondent failed to "introduce or attempt
to introduce any evidence as to the actual damages which
could reasonably be anticipated in the event of delay in
^completing the contract. :: ?.:•': ^*: ::.'•• fr.- ?-.;; i ~ : ;
:•:•• The trial court made no findings below that any
,-=: part of the contract between the parties was valid or
,

invalid as a penalty.; The respondent now asks this court
to make such a finding without any issue, evidence or
findings whatsoever decided, taken or made by the lower
court.

This court is an appeal court, not taking evidence,
-2-

but deciding upon an established record whether or not
a lower court erred in making findings and judgment based
upon a record of evidence.

Where no issue was raised in

the pleadings, no evidence taken by the trial court nor
findings made below, there is no issue before this court
to be decided.
Respondent correctly cites the rule that a
liquidated damage clause must bear some relationship to
the actual damages which could reasonably be anticipated
at the time the contract was made, then, without there being
any evidence in the record on what such anticipated actual
damages would be, blithely makes the assertion that the
liquidated damage clause does not contemplate any unforeseen damages which would not be fully compensated by the
payment to the general contractor's costs and expenses.
Such a statement ignores the realities within which a
contractor must operate, such as overhead and bonding limitations which prevent the bidding of additional jobs prior
to certificates of completion being issued on existing
jobs, and other factors not in the record.
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" :' ' POINT II. •

'

•.-.-•

' THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE INCLEMENT
WEATHER OF WHICH THE DEFENDANT COMPLAINED NEVER
: IN FACT HAMPERED THE WELDING OR CAUSED THE IMPROPER
WELDS WHICH CAUSED LEAKS.
Appellant makes no great claim as to the fact

that snow fell at the jobsite in question during the month
of November, 1971.

Such weather is usually expected in

the Salt Lake area during November.

The appellant does

claim that both Patterson and Roberts testified that this
inclement weather hampered welding on the pads and this
was the reason for the bad welds, yet the welding on the
jobs was completed by October 30, 1971.

The next phase

of the job was to put the pads under 150 pounds of air
pressure, soap the welds and valves and re-weld any leaking
welds.

Neither Roberts nor Patterson made any claim that

inclement weather held up this procedure (Tr. 2nd day,
pp. 35-47).

As to the welds and whether they tested out

under pressure, Patterson, at Tr. 2nd day, p. 42, L. 2-11,
deferred to a resident inspector and the daily records.

A

resident inspector who was on the job eight (8) hours a
day testified during the third day of trial at pp. 22-24
that the system was so full of leaks that an air compressor

-

4

-

••.'•

couldn't pump air into it fast enough to attain 150 pounds
of pressure, and Roberts' welder had to come back to remedy
the problem.

The records which were introduced from the

State Building Board (Exhibit 48-P) never once mention
valves as being a source of leaks, but only mention welds.
The inclement weather which Roberts complained of working
under during the month of November, 1971, would have never
affected the work if Roberts had commenced fabrication of
the pads on the job within two (2) days, or even a week,
of August 27, 1971, the day he was requested to commence
said work, rather than October 8, 1971, the day he actually
commenced said work, a period of forty-two (42) days,
nearly one-third (1/3) of the total days (120) required
by the prime- contract ,to perform.
- i

.'-;...

-With this undisputed evidence, the various findings

by the trial court that there was no delay on the part of
Roberts and that inclement weather caused delay on the
part of Roberts, have no foundation in the evidence and
should be modified accordingly.

The appellant asked for

the court to enter findings of fact that Roberts delayed
the job in its motion to amend findings of fact, but the
trial court refused.

-5-
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-POINT III. :•-"•...•

IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF .
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
'- FINDINGS WHERE THE TRIAL IS TO THE COURT WITHOUT
A JURY.
The attacks made by the appellant upon all of the
findings of fact of the trial court are primarily rooted
in the sufficiency of evidence to support those findings.
The trial court, in accordance with Rule 52(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, made findings of fact upon
which it based its judgment.

Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure provides for a motion to amend such
findings and allows it to be made together with a motion
for a new trial and also includes the following sentence:
"When findings of fact are made in actions
tried by the court without a jury, the

' \: '

question of the sufficiency of the evidence
r r.} n L I: ' ~.; 3 : - : ~ to support the f ind ing s may the reafter be
raised whether or not the party raising
"to :nc-.:

>>• j

the question has made in the district court/
an objection to such findings or has made

'~v : ;'•:

'either a motion to amend them, a motion f or
judgment or a motion for a new trial."

None of the cases cited by the respondent in his
brief with respect to amendments to findings or a motion
for a new trial apply to the situation in the instant case.
It is obvious that in drafting the foregoing rule, the
drafters realized that a trial court, once it has made its
-6-

decision upon its notes from the evidence, is not likely
to change it, and-on questions of sufficiency of the
evidence, the appellate court, because it can look at
the cold record taken by a certified court reporter, can
better evaluate the questions of sufficiency of the evidence
than the trial court who must rely upon handwritten notes
and memory impressions of the evidence.

Rule 52(b) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should govern the appellate court decision with respect to the issues raised by
the plaintiff as to the findings of fact, '." ' *>"••'•* • •"

--• '-

POINT IV.
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AMEND CHALLENGED ALL OF
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH REFUSED •••-''-'
TO ASSESS DAMAGES FOR DELAY ON THE PART OF ROBERTS.
The trial court was asked in the motion of the
appellant to amend findings of fact, to delete the finding
that Leger's claim for delay was limited only to the heating
panels or pads (R. p. 21). Appellant also asked the trial
court to assess damages for Roberts' refusal to complete
the gas line, failure to install promptly the heating panels
in a workmanlike manner and Roberts' failure to complete
the Salt Lake Road Shed job (R. p. 22). There is nothing

-7-

in the record to show that a new trial would do anything
other_than to re-hear the same evidence*

/The questions

raised on appeal were_.raised , in the, trial court. _- • * ,. . .. •

POINT V.
THE AWARD OF A T T O R N E Y S FEES WAS ERROR BY THE
.:;••.....:c

.,LOWER. COURT,,;.; : /£*_ ;i;-; c/v

-i: ;:-

:.

- > : ;•..-.-."

Respondent states that section,14-1-8 of the Utah

X o d e Annotated

(1953/, was ^enacted to provide adequate

compensation to a successful party who was forced, to sue
for the recovery of payments due under a prime contract.
It is clear from the record that Leger, as much as Roberts,
was forced to sue because of defalcations of Roberts upon
the contract, and to,obtain.an adjudication on liquidated
damages.

The summons and complaint were served upon Roberts

on October 2, 1972, while the State Building Board still
refused to issue its certificate of completion because of
the failure of Roberts to complete his contract until
February of 1972

(Tr. 2nd day, pp. 1 1 - 1 2 ) .

One can hardly

believe that the legislature enacted section 14-1-8 to
force a litigant to pay attorney's fees for the opposing
party where there are proved breaches of contract by that

opposing party and a legal basis in the contract between
the parties for withholding the funds actually withheld.
Appellant asserts that there is no particular "custom" as
to the awarding of attorney's fees in bond law cases in
the State of Utah; and even if there were such a "custom,"
the statutory law and Rules of Civil Procedure must
necessarily nullify any "custom" of lawyers of the courts.
To construe section 14-1-8 and rule otherwise asks this
court to engage in judicial legislation which this court
has wisely refused to do.
Respondent, in arguing "just compensation" and
"meaningless distinctions" asks this court to ignore the
plain wording of section 14-1-8, which provides that
attorney's fees shall be assessed as costs.

The same

arguments would have been applicable in the facts of
Walker Bank and Trust Co. v. New York Terminal Warehouse
Co., cited in appellant's and respondent's brief.

The

answer is simply that the statute and the rule require it
by their plain terms.

The legislature could have easily

provided that attorney's fees be awarded to the prevailing

-9-

party as part of its judgment, or merely awarded attorney's
fees without specifying them as costs. .:.

...

POINT VI.
IF THE JUDGMENT AGAINST LEGER IS MODIFIED, ANY
•'•.:• .

JUDGMENT AGAINST THE SURETY, UNITED STATES . - •:....
FIDELITY AND GUARANTY, MUST ALSO BE MODIFIED.
Suit was brought against the added defendant.

United States Fidelity and Guaranty, upon a cross-claim
based upon a surety bond written by defendant pursuant to
Title 14, Chapter 1, sec. 5, Utah Code Annotated, alleging
as grounds for recovery that Roberts furnished work and
materials to Leger. The liability of the added defendant
as to Claim I of defendant's counterclaim and cross-claim,
was and is completely dependent upon the liability of its
principal, leger, as no independent issues as to the bond
existed in the lawsuit. Roberts, the creditor, is entitled to but one performance upon the bond, and if it
receives that by payment or other satisfaction, the
surety, United States Fidelity and Guaranty, is discharged,
10 Williston on Contracts, 721 sec. 1219; Bushman Construction

-10-

Co. v. Air Force Academy Housing, Inc., 325 F2d 481
(CA10) (1964); see also 72 CJS 572-573/ sec. 92.
;;„.•;.-

\.

If this court modifies the obligation of Leger,

the obligation of the surety, United States Fidelity and
Guaranty, must also be modified even though it has been
reduced to judgment.

The reason is that the relationship

of principal and surety is not terminated by reason of a
judgment obtained against the principal and surety/,
10 Williston on Contracts, 813 sec. 1254; 72 CJS 698, _-. "sec. 243.

The courts will allow,a remedy to the surety

where a.whole or part of the judgment against the principal
has been satisfied or modified, Walin v. Young, Oregon 182
P2d 535, 541. V* --> y -i//£ ,.,•:> j,.ni 3^^- :, ri^::
:. -

•--- k.- ££— ; _...•

- In the case of Stolze v. United States Fidelity

and Guaranty, M o . 131 S2 915 (1910), the surety had posted
^supersedeas bond for the payment of a judgment for a _r
defendant on appeal.

The appellate court modified the

original judgment of $15,000.00 and another judgment for
$8,000.00 was entered which sum the defendant offered to
pay.. The plaintiff insisted on collecting interest on the
$8,000.00 which amounted to $1,254.00 and thereafter pursued both the defendant and its surety.

- 1 1 - .

.'.••

The trial court

decided in favor of the plaintiff and entered judgment for
$1,254.00 against both the defendant and the surety.

The

defendant alone appealed the trial court's decision and
the surety failed to appeal. .'The Missouri Supreme Court
held that no interest was due, reversed the judgment • - • •
against the defendant, and reiaanded the matter to the
trial court. The plaintiff then began execution upon the
judgment against the surety and the trial court held that
plaintiff could not enforce the judgment against the surety
for the reason that the undertaking of the surety is •-•'—
1. -:secondary only, and where the primary obligation had been
::ruled as not being owed by an appellate court, the ' • —
unappealed judgment against the surety was discharged and
execution could not issue thereon. Even though the statute
under which the bond was posted provided for joint and ;~™
several liability on the part of the principal and surety,
the Missouri Supreme Court on appeal ruled that such '
wording does not destroy the equity between principal and
surety that once the obligation of the principal is dis~ :
charged, the surety is discharged also, affirming the trial
court ruling, thus any modification of the judgment made

-12-
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Respectfully submitted,
RYBERG, McCOY
&

HALGREN

John L . McCoy
attorney fOT. y tQr
Appei l a n t
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